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Article 3

THE DUTY OF AN AUTOMOBILE OWNER TO A
GRATUITOUS GUEST
The duty of an automobile owner, and the driver, to the
hitch-hiker, the social guest, and other gratuitous passengers, is a question of much interest not only to the courts
and to the lawyers in its many legal aspects, but also is of
much practical concern and speculation to the automobile
owning layman as well. The matter is such that the legislatures of the various states are not unaffected and some
have made it the subject of recent legislation.' At the present writing the issue considered herein is frequently before
the courts for decision and bids to become a prolific source
of tort litigation, whereas in 1917 when the case of Massaletti v. Fitzroy2 was before the courts in Massachusetts,
there were not over a half dozen precedents in the entire
United States. 3 This is true not only because accidents are
becoming more and more numerous as the automobile population increases, nor solely because guests are less appreciative of their host's dignity and good will than formerly, but
to great extent because as between the insurance company
which bears the brunt of the host's financial loss, and the
guest, there arises no keen resentment in the breaking of a
close relationship. Furthermore, the host and the guest remain friends even in battle. In support of the statement
just made it might not be amiss to quote a sentence or two
from the counsel's argument to the jury in a recent Vermont
case,' wherein the defendant was amply insured and her girl
companion was suing as the injured plaintiff. The following
is a quotation from plaintiff's attorney:
1

PUBLIC ACTS OF CONN.

(1927)

C. 308; CODE OF IOWA (1924)

§ 5026, as

amended 42 General Assembly, C. 119 (1927); OREON SEssIoN LAWS OF (1927) C.
342 (held unconstitutional).
2 228 Mass. 487, 118 N. E. 168, L. R. A. 1918 C: 264 (1917).
3

6 VtR. L. REv. 593.

4

Landry v. Hubert, 100 Ver. 268, 137 Atl. 97 (1927).
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"I say she, (meaning the defendant) is unconcerned, that her conduct from start to finish throughout the trial shows that she is unconcerned . . . . and I say now that she will be unconcerned tomorrow
whatever your verdict."

Upon objection, and caution of improper argument, he
added:
"Of course, that is my prediction; she may get terribly wrought
up, but I doubt it."

It is not to be inferred from this that such litigation is
collusive, nor lacking in a righteous claim. In fact, in the
case just referred to the plaintiff had lost an eye in a collision resulting from the defendant's negligent operation of
an automobile with defective brakes.
The object sought in the discussion herein is threefold.
First, to point out the legal liability of an owner of an automobile to a guest injured while rid ing therein through the
negligence of the driver wheif the automobile is being operated either by the owner himself, or by his agent, whether
that agent be an agent in fact, or an agent evolved through
the application of the family car doctrine, or by any other
rule of law. Second, the duty of the owner of an automobile
to his gratuitous passenger to keep his car in a safe condition, and the basis for liability to the guest, if any, for injuries caused by his defective motor vehicle. Third, to state
merely, but not to discuss, the duty of the guest to keep a
lookout and to otherwise use due care for his own safety.
It is to be noted that it is not the purpose of this article
to discuss the merits or demerits of the "family purpose car"
doctrine, nor to delve into the liability of a parent for the
negligent use of his automobile by the members of his family except in so far as it conceded that such member is acting
as the owner's agent under some or any rule of law. Also,
what is said herein is not intended to apply to automobiles
engaged in the business of common carriers of passengers
such as bus lines.
In view of the fact that the doctrine of imputed negligence
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as applied to passengers not having control over the driver,
nor engaged in a joint enterprise with him, has been so universally repudiated, that element is eliminated from consideration.5 It is to be remembered, however, that it is still
well settled law in Michigan that the guest in a private vehicle, such as is the wife,' or any other gratuitous passenger
for pleasure, not a minor,7 is barred from recovery from a
third person for injuries caused by such person's negligence
when the driver of the car in which the guest is riding is also
negligent. The negligence of the driver is thus charged also
to the occupant.
The difficult question as to when the passenger is engaged
in a joint enterprise with the driver so that the passenger is
charged with the driver's negligence and, therefore, barred
from recovery is discussed elsewhere in this volume.'
On the points in issue as heretofore mentioned there exist
many situations as between owner, driver, and guest, which
give rise to varying duties and liabilities. These must be discussed for a clear understanding of the problems involved.
Three groups of factual relation are hereafter listed:
Group I. What is the legal duty of the owner of an automobile to a guest riding in his car when the owner is driving and
(a) The guest is invited to ride by the driver
(b) The guest is self-invited, or else is present
by
(c) sufferance.
(d) The guest is there without the knowledge
or invitation of the driver.
5 Little v. Hackett, 110 U. S. 366, 6 Sup. Ct. 391, 29 L. Ed. 652 (1885);
Bmuzy ON AUTOMOBILES (6th ed. 1929) 496, § 624; THROCKMORTON'S COOLEY ON
ToRTS (1930) 663, § 334.
6 Holsaple v. Superintendents of the Poor, 232 Mich. 603, 206 N. W. 529
(1925).
7 June v. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co., 232 Mich. 449, 205 N. W. 181
(1925).
8 W. D. Rollison, "Joint Enterprise' in the Law of Imputed Negligence, 6
Nom D Aea L. 172 (1931).
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'Group II. What is the legal duty of the owner of an automobile to a guest when said motor vehicle is
being driven by an agent when,
(a) The owner is absent in the situations listed
in the subheadings in Group I
(b) The owner is present in the same situations as in (a) herein.
Group III. What is the legal duty of the owner of an automobile to his gratuitous guest when the car is
defective, and the guest is injured because of
that defect when,
(a) The owner and. guest both have knowledge of the defect.
(b) Neither the owner nor guest have such
knowledge
(c) The owner has knowledge of the defect,
but the guest has not.
At the outset it can be stated that the great weight of
authority on the duty which the owner of an automobile
owes to an invited guest when driving is to exercise ordinary
and reasonable care in its operation, and not unreasonably
to expose the guest to danger and injury by increasing the
hazard of travel.
This rule with various ramifications due to facts is upheld in the following states: Alabama,9 Arizona,1 ° Arkansas," California, 2 Connecticut, (now changed by statute),"s
9
10

11
12

Thomas v. Carter, 218 Ala. 55, 117 So. 634 (1927).
Central Copper Co. v. Klefisch, 34 Ariz. 230, 270 Pac. 629 (1928).

Bennett v. Bell, 176 Ark. 690, 3 S. W. (2d) 996 (1928).
Brown v. Davis, 84 Cal. App. 180, 257 Pac. 877 (1927)

(by Civil Code

§ 2096).
13 Davis v. Margolis, 107 Conn. 417, 140 At]. 823 (1928). Rule is now
changed by statute. Under Chapter 308, PuBLic AcTs op CoNN. (1927), there is
no liability to the gratuitous passenger in an automobile except for intentional
injury or reckless disregard of the rights of others. Held constitutional in Silver
v. Silver, 108 Conn. 371, 143 Atl. 240 (1928). Upheld in U. S. Supreme Court
(1929) 280 U. S. 117, 50 Sup. Ct. Rep. 57.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

Florida, 14 Idaho, 5 Illinois,"6 Indiana,' Iowa, (now changed
by statute)," 8 Kansas, 9 Kentucky,2" Louisiana,"' Maine, 2
Maryland,2" Michigan,24 Minnesota,25 Montana,26 Nebraska,27 Nevada,28 New Hampshire,2" New Jersey,"0 New
York,"l North Carolina,32 North Dakota," Ohio, 4 Oregon, 5 Pennsylvania,36 Tennessee," Texas,38 Vermont, 9
See Boyle v. Dolan, 97 Fla. 219, 120 So. 334 (1929).
Dale v. Jaeger, 44 Ida. 576, 258 Pac. 1081 (1927).
16 Waitrovich v. Black, 254 Ill. App. 49 (1929); Richardson v. Moore, 254
Ill. App. 511 (1929); Masten v. Cousins, 216 Ill. App. 268 (1919).
17
Munson v. Rupker, 148 N. E. 169 (Ind. App. 1925). Rehearing denied,
151 N. E. 101 (1926).
18 Codner v. Stowe, 201 Iowa 800, 208 N. W. 330 (1926). Changed by
statute, CODE OF IOWA (1924) § 5026, as qmended 42 G. A. C. 119 (1927). Owner
is liable for automobile even in hands of bailee, but not liable to guest unless
injury is caused by driver being under the influence of liquor, or by his reckless
operation. Statute is interpreted in Puckett v. Paulthorpe, 207 Iowa 613, 223 N.
W. 254 (1929).
19 Ferguson v. Lang, 126 Kan. 273, 268 Pac. 117 (1928); Mayberry v.
Siney, 18 Kan. 291 (1877) (buggy).
20 Chambers v. Hawkins, 233 Ky. 211, 25 S. W. (2d) 363 (1930).
21 Lawrason v. Richard, 129 So. 250 (La. App. 1930).
22 Prinn v. De Rice, 149 At. 580 (Me. 1930).
23 Pearson v. Lakin, 147 Md. 1, 127 AtI. 387 (1925).
24 Hemington v. Hemington, 221 Mich. 206, 190 N. W. 683 (1922). (Imputed negligence doctrine of Michigan not treated.) Action was by guest (mother)
against host (daughter) and did not involve a third party.
25 Fink v. Baer, 180 Minn. 433, 230 N. W. 888 (1930).
26 Hornbeck v. Richards, 80 Mont. 27, 257 Pac. 1025 (1927).
27 Bauer v. Gries, 105 Neb. 381, 181 N. W. 156 (1920).
28 Thorne v. Lampros, 288 Pac. 601 (Nev. 1930).
29 Chamberlain v. Pickering, 148 Atl. 466, 469 (N. H. 1929).
So Paiewonsky v. Joffe, 101 N. J. L. 521, 129 AtI. 142 (1925).
31 Higgins v. Mason, 255 N. Y. 104, 174 N. E. 77 (1930).
32 Ballinger v. Thomas, 195 N. C. 517, 142 S. E. 761 (1928).
33 Bolton v. Wells, 58 N. D. 286, 225 N. W. 791 (1929).
84 Bailey v. Parker, 34 Oh. App. 207, 170 N. E. 607 (1930).
35 Stewart v. Houck, 127, Ore. 589, 271 Pac. 998, 61 A. L. R. 1236 (1928).
SassioN LAws (1927) C. 342, abolishing all duty of care to gratuitous guest held
contrary to CoNsT. ART. 1, § 10. Court distinguishes Connecticut statute which
was held constitutional.
36
Cody v. Venzie, 263 Pa. 541, 107 AtI. 383 (1919).
("Family
87 Schwartz v. Johnson, 152 Tenn. 586, 280 S. W. 32 (1926).
purpose doctrine" applied.)
38 Offer v. Swancoat, 27 S. W. (2d) 899 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
89 Supra note 4.
14

15
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Virginia,4 ° West Virginia,41 Wisconsin," and Wyoming."
A minority holding requires that the driver must be
guilty of gross negligence before liability shall be imposed
on him for injuries caused to the invited guest.
The states requiring gross negligence for liability are the
following: Georgia, 44 Massachusetts, 45 Washington.4 6
A number of states, as has already been indicated, have
made statutory changes in the law relating to the duty owed
by the owner and driver to the gratuitous guest.4 These
alterations of the existing law have, in the main, been in the
owner's behalf. In most instances he is held responsible
under the legislative acts only where he is wilfully and
wantonly negligent, or guilty of reckless operation of the
motor vehicle, or intoxicated. At least one state attempted
to do away with the duty to use any care to the guest, but
the statute was held contrary to the provisions of the state
constitution."'
While New Jersey and Alabama are listed supra under
the majority rule requiring ordinary and reasonable care on
the part of the driver of an automobile toward an invited
guest, the courts of those states limit the iule to guests invited. Where the guest is self-invited or is present by sufferance liability is made to depend on wilful and wanton injury.
Thus in the New Jersey case of Faggioniv. Weiss,4 9 where
the plaintiff, a minor, was in defendant's car, either by invi40

Morris v. Peyton, 148 Va. 812, 139 S. E. 500 (1927).

41 Marple v. Haddad, 103 W. Va. 508, 138 S. E. 113, 61 A. L. R. 1248
(1927)
42 Olson v. Hermansen, 196 Wis. 614, 220 N. W. 203, 61 A. L. R. 1243 (1928).
48 Collins v. Anderson, 37 Wyo. 275, 260 Pac. 1089 (1927).
44 Meddin v. Karsman, 152 S. E. 601 (Ga. App. 1930); Peavy v. Peavy,
36 Ga. App. 202, 136 S. E. 96 [Cnrni CouE (1910) § 3473].
45 Mason v. Thomas, 174 N. E. 217 (Mass. 1931).
46 Welch v. Auseth, 156 Wash. 652, 287 Pac. 899 (1930).
47 See supra notes 13 and 18.
48 Supra note 35.
49 99 N. J. L. 157, 122 Atl. 840 (1923).
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tation, or as a mere permitted licensee, it was held that the
driver of a private vehicle owes no duty to a trespasser or
mere licensee except to abstain from acts wilfully injurious.
The court, not knowing whether the plaintiff was present
by invitation or by self-invitation, that is, at his own request, said:
"If then, the young plaintiff was invited, in the legal sense of the
word, to ride on defendant's car, the trial judge properly charged
that defendant owed him the duty of reasonable care in transporting him, so long as that status continued."

The court, however, said further:
"There was, however, another theory of the case open for consideration by the jury, viz. that the infant plaintiff was at best a mere
licensee in the car and on that theory it 'was agreed that the defendant owed him no duty except to abstain from Acts wilfully injurious.
Such was the rube in the recent supreme court case of Lutvin v. Dopkus 94 N. J. Law, 64, 108 Adt. 862, where plaintiff solicited a ride
and defendant simply acceded to their request."

Alabama interprets the rule in a similar fashion. In
5" where the defendant, owner and his wife
Thomas v. Carter,
invited a friend, Jewel Thomas and her daughter, the plain-

tiff, to accompany them on a trip, and due to the negligence
of Jewel Thomas, who was permitted to drive, the car overturned and injured the plaintiff, recovery was permitted on
proof of lack of due care. The court distinguished the case
cited by the defendant, Crider v. Yolande Coal & Coke
Co.,5 which required proof of wilful injury to the guest in
order to hold the owner liable. In refusing the defendant's
requested instructions, the court said:
"They proceed upon the theory that if appellant (plaintiff) was a
mere licensee, or was riding in the defendant's automobile for her own
pleasure, she could not recover for injuries inflicted through the negligence of the defendant or his driver. Appellant (plaintiff) according
to the undisputed evidence, was in the automobile on the express invitation of the defendant owner-she was an invitee, and the fact that
it was her pleasure to accept the invitation did not relieve defendant
218 Ala. 55, 117 So. 634 (1927-rehearing 1928).
51 206 Ala. 71, 89 So. 285 (1921).
50
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or his agent of the duty to exercise at least ordinary care for her
safety . . . Appellee (defendant) cites Crider v. Yolande Coal Co.
....
but in that case the plaintiff was on defendant's truck, not by
invitation of the owner, nor indeed by the invitation of the driver of
the truck, but merely by the tolerance of the driver-wherefore that
case differs materially in its facts and legal aspects from the case in
hand."
The distinction the courts in New Jersey and Alabama
make in holding that there is a different kind of care owed
to a gratuitous guest depending upon whether the guest is
invited or requests the invitation, (self-invited), or is permitted to ride without anything said about an invitation,
(sufferance) seems untenable especially when based upon
the theory that one is a legal invitee, and the others licensees. It is not the invitation that distinguishes a legal invitee
from a licensee, but the mutuality of benefit. In law the invited gratuitous guest for social purposes is not a legal invitee, but a licensee in the same manner as the guest who is
self-invited, or for that matter present by sufferance. The
guest, whether invited because the driver is naturally charitable, or because he is stirred to charity by a request, or if
the guest is just merely permitted to get and stay on, is yet
a licensee. Any such guest is not there for the legal benefit
of the driver. There is no legal mutuality of interest, though
the conversation engendered may be the beginning of a long
friendship. When a guest is invited for the evening to play
bridge, or any other such purpose, the duty owed by the
owner of the premises is the duty owed not to the invitee,
but that owed to the licensee.52 This matter is well considered in the case of Greenfield v. Miller, 3 where the defendant invited the plaintiff and her husband to spend New
Year's Eve and New Year's Day at the home of the defendant. The home had been recently finished, the floors highly
polished, and covered with oriental rugs. The plaintiff
slipped on one of the rugs and was injured. She sued for
52
53

Southcote v. Stanley, 1. Hurl. & Nor. 247 (1856).
173 Wis. 184, 180 N. W. 834 (1921).
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damages and it was attempted to show that she was a legal
invitee, but the court stated that there must be some benefit
to the invitor, some mutuality of interest, to constitute the
guest a legal invitee, and if the interest is such that only
concerns the person entering, then he is but a mere licefisee.
It is also stated therein that the guest or friendly visitor
enters on no better footing than a bare licensee in so far as
the question of invitation is concerned.5
It is not my contention that the invited passenger should
be barred from recovery, because he is a licensee, but that
no distinction should be drawn between the invited and the
self-invited guests, or the guest by sufferance. In most states
there is no distinction made in the duty owed by the owner
of an automobile to the gratuitous guest on grounds of the
manner of invitation. Whether the guest is invited, self-invited, or a guest at sufferance is not a decisive factor. This
is the rule in most jurisdictions whether they follow the
minority or the majority ruling on the question of the degree
of care. If *as under the majority rule ordinary care is required and owed to the invited guest, so then is ordinary
care owed to the self-invited guest. If as under the minority
view slight care is owed to the social invitee, so then is slight
care owed to the self-invitee. Thus, we find in the Arkansas
case of Black v. Goldweber,55 where the plaintiff asked the
defendant to be permitted to accompany him on a journey
to a certain point so that she could see her children, the trial
court was reversed for instructing a verdict for the defendant. The trial court went on the theory that the only duty
the defendant owed the plaintiff while riding in his automobile as a self-invited guest was to refrain from injuring her
wilfully or wantonly. Justice Humphreys in reversing the decision said that though the doctrine of the lower court was
supported by decisions in New Jersey and two or three other
states which had adopted that view that:
54

See BIGELOW, ToRmh (8th ed.)

55

172 Ark. 862, 291 S. W. 76 (1927).

160, 161.
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"The prevailing rule, approved by recent decisions requires drivers
of automobiles to exercise ordinary care in the operation thereof to
transport their passengers safely, whether guests by sufferance, sdfinvited guests, or invited guests."

In the same case Judges Hart and Kirby concurred in the
result, but held to the view that in a gratuitous carriage for
the sole benefit of the guest, the law requires only slight diligence, and makes the owner liable only for gross negligence.
They based their view on the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania cases considered hereafter, but in Bennett v. Bell,56
decided the following year, the same Justice Kirby stated:
"The driver of an automobile or motor vehicle is bound to the
exercise of ordinary care in the operation thereof for the safe transportation of his guests and other passengers and to avoid personal
injury to themi, and this duty extends to all such passengers wkether
guests by sufferance, invited, or self-invited."

Most courts which have considered the principles involved
in the host-guest cases refuse as in the Arkansas decision to
draw any line of demarcation between invited and self-invited guests.57 The self-invited party and the guest at sufferance are not such outlaws as to be treated any the less as
human beings. No one is legally permitted upon principles
of well established law to take.a person into his custody and
control in any manner and, then be actively negligent toward him, or to increase the hazard accepted. The law requires from all persons reasonable care for the safety of life
and limb of any other person and it makes no exemption to
those who render gratuitous services or free automobile
rides. Even the guest at sufferance is entitled to due care
according to the exigencies of the particular case, and in
Grabau v. Pudwill,5 s where the plaintiff, a minor, received
no invitation, but was permitted with full knowledge of the
56 Supra note 11.
57 Munson v. Rupker, supra note 17; Rappaport v. Stockdale, 160 Minn.
78, 199 N. W. 513 (1924); Grabau v. Pudwill, 45 N. D. 423, 178 N. W. 124
(1920); Marple v. Haddad, supra note 41; Mitchell v. Raymond, 181 Wis. 591,
195 N. W. 855 (1923).

58 45 N. D. 423, 178 N. W. 124 (1920).
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defendants to ride 6n the running board of the car, in full
view of the driver, he was permitted a recovery in spite of
the fact that he was a guest merely at sufferance. The court
stated that even though the plaintiff was a gratuitous
passenger present only by acquiescence, still the defendants
were not relieved from the exercise of ordinary care for the
plaintiff's safety.
The court also indicates in the above case that active negligence is not an essential to recovery, but it should be noted
that active and affirmative negligence was clearly present.
A well considered and a leading case on the host-guest
duties is the Indiana decision of Munson v. Rupker5 9 Perhaps no better comment could be made than to quote the
words of the court:
"It seems to us that the only sensible and humane rule is that an

owner and driver of an automobile owes a guest at sufferance the duty
of using reasonable care so as not to injure him. The rule as to trespassers and licensees upon real estate, with all its niceties and distinctions, is not to be applied to one riding in an automobile at the
invitation of or with the knowledge and tacit consent of the owner and
operator of the automobile. A trespasser and licensee going upon a
tract of-land-an inert, immovable body-takes it as he finds it, with
knowledge that the owner cannot and will not by any act of his start
it in motion and hurl it through space in a manner that may mean
death to him who enters thereon. He who enters an auto to take a
ride with the owner also takes the automobile and the driver as he
finds them. But when the owner of the auto starts it in motion, he,
as it were, takes the life of his guest into his keeping and in the operation of such car, he must use reasonable care not to injure anyone
riding therein with his knowledge and consent. It will not do to say
that the operator of an automobile owes no more duty to a person
riding with him as a guest at sufferance, or as a self-invited guest, than
a gratuitous bailee owes to A block of wood. The law exacts of one'
who puts a force in motion that he shall control it with skill and care
in proportion to the danger created. This rule applies to a guest at
sufferance as well as a guest by invitation."

It is submitted that even following the rules of property
in most cases there will still be the duty to use ordinary
59 Supra note 17.
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and reasonable care, for even though the premises need
not be safe for licensees and trespassers, still there rests the
duty of refraining not only from wilful injury, but also to
refrain from increasing the hazard toward a person once he
is discovered. Active negligence even toward a discovered
trespasser entails liability. The condition in which one keeps
his premises is one thing, the way he acts toward a person
on those premises is another."°
Pennsylvania applying rules analogous to the gratuitous
bailment of personal property in the case of Cody v.
Venzie, 6" obtains a result more or less a model of its own.
In that case the defendint, the owner of the car, invited the
plaintiffs who are his wife's sister and brother-in-law, to accompany him. The lower court held that the plaintiff could
not recover except upon proof of wanton and wilful negligence, and entered a verdict for the defendant. The upper
court reversed the judgment and awarded a new trial on
the ground that the defendant's want of ordinary care was
for jury and stated:
"It follows, therefore, that when a gratuitous carriage is for the
sole benefit of the guest the law requires slight diligence and makes
the carrier only responsible for gross neglect; if it is for the sole benefit of the carrier the law requires great diligence and makes the carrier responsible for slight neglect; and where it is for the benefit or
pleasure of both parties as in the instant case, it requires ordinary
diligence and makes the carrier responsible for ordinary neglect."

Most states do not recognize degrees of negligence and
for that reason would not be in accord on that point with
the instant case. In addition it is questionable whether the
analogy of gratuitous bailments of personal property should

apply. The owner and driver of an automobile is not dealing
with property rights, but with human life.
60 Patnode v. Foote, 153 App. Div. 499, 138 N. Y. S. 221 (1912) ; O'Shea v.
Lavoy, 175 Wis. 456, 20 A. L. R. 1008, 185 N. W. 525 (1921).
61 263 Pa. 541, 107 AtI. 383 (1919).
62 THROCKMORTON'S COOLEY ON TORTS, § 317; Chi. R. I. and P. Ry. Co. v.
Hamler, 215 III. 525, 74 N. E. 705, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 674 (1905); Union Traction Co. v. Berry, 188 Ind. 514, 121 N. E. 655, 32 A. L. R. 1171 (1919).
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It has been stated that the prevailing tendency at the
present time in Pennsylvania is to hold the host liable for
failure to use ordinary care, but the cases are not necessarily
out of harmony with the Cody decision. Ordinary care was
required in that case because the guest was invited and the
host-guest relation was treated as an arrangement of mutual
benefit and pleasure. Evidently, under the court's dictum
the benefit depends on invitation, self-invitation, or sufferance. Typical of the later decisions is the case of Moquin v.
Mervine, 3 where the guests were invited and ordinary and
reasonable care was required, but nothing is said to indicate
what the holding would be if the guests were self-invited
for their own sole benefit. The soundness or unsoundness of
invitation as a test of benefit has already been treated herein. The states adhering to the minority view that permit
recovery only where there is gross negligence also adopt the
4
analogy of gratuitous bailment of personal property.
Massachusetts has adhered to the rule of gross negligence
by a long line of decisions, many very recent. 5 The "gross
negligence" rule thbugh requiring less care on the part of
the owner toward his guest than does the prevailing "ordinary care" rule, does not require wanton or wilful injury to
be shown as a basis of recovery. As said in substance in
Cook v. Cole,"0 gross negligence differs in a degree rather
than kind from ordinary negligence and is materially more
want of care than constitutes simple inadvertence, yet it
need not amount to such reckless disregard of probable consequences as is equivalent to a wilful and intentional wrong.
It is negligence of an aggravated character, and substantially greater want of care than ordinary negligence. 6
63

297 Pa. 79, 146 Ati. 443 (1929).

64 Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 118 N. E. 168 (1917).
65 Parker v. Moody, 174 N. E. 189 (Mass. 1931); Mason v. Thomas, 174
N. E. 217 (Mass. 1931); Cook v. Cole, 174 N. E. 271 (Mass. 1931).
60 See supra note 65.
67 Altman v. Aronson, 231 Mass. 581, 591-3, 121 N. E. 505, 4 A. L. R. 1185
(1919).
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Neither do the jurisdictions adopting the gross negligence
rule draw any distinction between guests by invitation, and
guests by acquiescence." 8 If then it is the prevailing view
based on principles of sound law that no distinction should
be drawn between guests invited, self-invited, or at sufferance, the duty owed to all is the duty owed to the invitee.
It has already been shown that the duty owed to an invited
guest is not to be actively negligent toward him, or stated
in another way, the owner must use ordinary and reasonable
care according to the exigencies of the case. In addition it
can be said that though I may be under no legal obligation
to give aid, as did the Good Samaritan,to the person injured
by the roadside, yet once I take such a person into my custody, or undertake to care for him, I take upon myself the
legal duty to use due care in the doing. Any rule that departs from this is departing from established principles of
69
law.
Granting that the obligation of the owner of a motor vehicle is to be ordinarily prudent to the licensee, what is his
relation to the trespasser?-The duty to the trespasser who
is riding in an automobile without the driver's knowledge is
to refrain from wanton and wilful injury. The negligence of
the driver in such a case, whether ordinary or gross, should
not be ground for recovery. Any other standard of conduct
in such a case would be extremely burdensome and unjust.
The negligence of the owner in this situation would not be
7
negligence to the trespasser but only negligence in the air. 0
There is no principle of law on which to base a duty to the
unexpected and wrongdoing trespasser. If, however, the
driver has knowledge of the trespasser's presence, then it
68 Cook v. Cole, supra note 65.
69 Slater v. Ill. Cent. Ry., 209 Fed. 480 (1911); Dycke v. Vicksburg, etc.
R. Co., 79 Miss. 361, 30. So. 711 (1901); Bresnahan v. Lansdale Co., 51 Ati.
624 (R. I. 1900); Gates v. C. & 0. Ry. Co., 185 Ky. 24, 213 S. W. 564, 5
A. L. R. 507 (1919) and note; Tullgren v. Amoskeag Co., 82 N. H. 268, 133 AtI.
4 (1926).

7o Palsgraf v. Long Island Rd. Co., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928).
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seems on principle that the same rules as heretofore discussed should apply. The trespasser when permitted to remain is no more or less than a guest at sufferance. The duty
of using due and reasonable care to a person present so as
not to be actively negligent toward him, and thus not to
increase the existing hazard, is a well recognized standard
toward all. A person need not keep his premises safe for
trespassers, but once the trespasser is discovered on the
premises by the owner thereof, or anyone else, there arises
the duty not to actively take part in his injury without justification for after all a trespasser is not outside the protection
of the law. Condition of premises, and conduct on the premises in relation to those present and known, as stated before,
are two different sets of facts and governed by two different
rules of law. The case of Herrick v. Wixom 7 should be decisive of the matter. In that case the plaintiff entered a circus
tent without permission from the owner, and took his seat
with the invitees. A clown negligently exploded a fire cracker
injuring the plaintiff. There the court, admitting the principle that a trespasser who suffers an injury because of the
dangerous condition of premises is without a remedy, definitely ruled that where a trespasser is discovered upon the
premises by the owner or occupant he, the trespasser, is not
outside the law, and that the negligent owner must respond
in damages for his negligence causing injury.
The liability of the owner of an automobile so far has been
treated as if it were the same in all respects as that of the
driver and vice versa. That is not necessarily true. What has
been said is applicable to the driver whether owner, an agent
of the owner, or bailee of the automobile. The driver's liability does not depend on ownership, but upon his conduct
as a driver. It also applies to the owner naturally when the
automobile is being driven by him. It is also true that the
71
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owner is liable for culpable injury to a guest when the motor
vehicle is driven by an agent of the owner when the agent
is acting within the scope, or apparent scope, of his authority in having guests ride in the automobile. Thus if the
agent of the owner whether son, daughter, another guest,
or a stranger, is permitted or instructed to invite guests for
a ride, whether, for business or for pleasure, and through the
culpability of the agent a guest is injured, the owner will be
held liable to respond in damages to the injured party according to the principles as enumerated heretofore. The
presence or non-presence of the owner in the event of an
injury to the guest is unimportant except in so far as it
bears on the question of the authority of the driver. For example, if the owner is present, and allows his agent to invite
a guest for a ride, that would indicate authority or apparent
authority on the part of the agent to so invite, but if the
owner is absent, other evidence would be necessary to establish such authority on the .part of the agent. If the agent
when the owner is not present invites or permits a guest to
become a passenger, and the agent is instructed not to permit or invite guests to ride, the agent is thus acting outside
his authority, and the owner is not responsible for an injury to the guest caused by the agent's negligence.73 In such
a case, the guest is a social invitee (licensee) of the driver,
but a trespasser to the owner of the automobile. The rules
of liability must accordingly be applied. Thus it can easily
be seen that the injured guest, though a trespasser to the
owner and barred from recovery as to him, yet such guest
may still have a cause of action against the driver, who invited or permitted his presence. 4 It was held in Higbee
Company v. Jackson 5 that a guest could recover from the
owner when injured by the agent's negligent driving even
73
Walker
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Rolfe v. Hewitt, 227 N. Y. 486, 125 N. E. 804, 14 A. L. R. 125 (1920);
v. Fuller, 223 Mass. 566, 112 N. E. 230 (1916).
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when the agent was acting contrary to instruction (both real
and apparent) in inviting the guest, if the guest could show
wanton negligence on the part of the agent. This decision,
however, is unsound on principle and was very recently
overruled in Union Gas & Electric Co. v. Crouch.7 6 The
court acted on the rule that even a trespasser could recover
for wanton, wilful injury. The rule is correct, but the wanton
misconduct was not on the part of the owner, but that of the
agent who was acting entirely outside of his agency, both
real and apparent.
We can thus see that the owner is not liable for guests invited to ride by the chauffeur, or other agent where the
owner's instructions are violated in so doing, or the agent is
otherwise digressing from his employment. 7 7 The mere sending of a private car by the owner to have his driver do an
errand does not give the driver authority to pick up some
person he may meet casually or otherwise. If then such a
guest is injured by the driver's negligence, the driver, but
not the owner, is liable, if anyone. It is not the instruction
that is the controlling feature, but whether the agent has
the real or apparent, express or implied authority to take
guests in the particular instance. Hence in those states adhering to the "family car doctrine" 78 where the father permits his son to take the automobile for the pleasure of his
son and his guests, the father would be liable to the guests
for any injury they might receive as the proximate result of
the son's failure to use due care, providing the defense of
contributory negligence did not intervene. Of course whether
the family car theory is adopted or not, if the son or other
member of the family is acting as an agent of the father,
then the father is liable to the gratuitous guest.
76
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The final element for consideration is, what duty does
the driver of the automobile owe the gratuitous guest to
have his motor vehicle in a safe condition? In brief, this
duty is almost in perfect analogy with the duty of the owner
of premises. Whether we wish to admit or deny that the
principles of property liability as between licensor and licensee are applicable to the host-guest relation in the management of the automobile, such rules are clearly fitting when
applied to the condition of the motor vehicle itself.79
The owner of property owes no duty to a licensee to keep
his premises safe. The social guest whether invited or selfinvited is a licensee. The licensee takes the premises as he
finds them subject to the perils. However, the owner owes
the licensee the duty to notify him of any traps, or pitfalls,
or hidden defects, of which he has knowledge. If the defect
is known to the licensee, or is one not likely to produce injury, or is one which in the ordinary course of events the
licensee would probably and reasonably discover without
injury, then the owner is under no duty to inform the licen80
see.
The owner of an automobile has these same duties in
respect to its condition. The licensee-invited or self-invited
or by sufferance-takes the automobile as he finds it, subject to all its individuating characteristics. The owner must
notify his guest of any hidden perils of which he has knowledge, and the guest has not. If the guest could reasonably
be expected to notice the defect or does see it, he assumes
the risk.
The prevailing rule that the host is obliged not to increase
the existing hazard, and to refrain from increasing the guest's
danger of injury, by implication admits that the guest takes
all existing risks so long as they are not increased by the
79 Higgins v. Mason, 255 N. Y. 104, 174 N. E. 77 (1930); O'Shea v. Lavoy,
175 Wis. 456, 185 N. W. 525, 20 A. L. R. 1008 (1921).
80 See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TomiS (AmERICAN LAW INSTITUTE)
TNTATIVE Dns No. 4, § 212.
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driver. Hence the mechanism of the car and the skill of the
driver are taken as is. Where the owner does not know of
the defect, he is not liable because he is violating no duty.
Where the guest does know of the defect, he assumes the
risk. Where neither are aware of the peril, there is no liability because again there is no breach of duty that is owed
by the owner to the guest. The driver, however, cannot induce a guest to enter into a trap which he, the driver, knows
and the guests does not, without being remiss in his duty.
Pitfalls and traps are not accepted when unknown by the
guest and neither is the owner living up to his duty in failing
to notify of the danger when he is aware of it. A defect
such as would constitute a trap is probably nothing more
than a danger which a guest who is unacquainted with the
situation could not avoid by the use of ordinary skill and
8
care. '
There is, however, no duty of inspection on the part of
the owner. Thus in the recent case of Higgins v. Mason,82
where Josephine Higgins, her husband, Robert Higgins, and
defendant's wife, Grace Mason, were guests in the defendant's car on a trip, and the car was being driven by the
plaintiff, Josephine Higgins the plaintiff, was denied recovery for the death of her husband who was killed when the
car overturned due to a defective spindle pin. The pin held
the wheel in alignment. It had been causing trouble to the
owner before, and caused trouble to the plaintiff on this
occasion in that it made steering difficult. All present knew
something was wrong, but were unaware of anything seriously dangerous, or that any unreasonable risk was involved.
The defendant exposed himself and wife to the same perils.
The court said:
"Under the authorities, the defendant host, George Mason, was not
liable for the death of his guest, Robert Higgins, because of a mechanical defect in the car, although Mason, by inspection, might have
81
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discovered the fault, since Higgins in accepting the invitation to ride,
must have taken the car as he found it, and no duty of inspection
rested upon Mason. Mason would be liable only if he knew of the
dangerous condition; realized that it involved an unreasonable risk;
believed that the guests would not discover the condition or realize
the risk; and failed to warn them of the condition and the risk in-

volved. If Mason's failure to realize that the 'something' which was
wrong with the automobile constituted a dangerous condition was due
to his lack of mechanical knowledge, that was a risk assumed by the
guests when they accepted the invitation to take the trip. Moreover,

all of the guests were drivers of automobiles, so that if Mason did
realize the danger indicated by the swerve, he could not have thought
that his guests were unaware of it."

Where the owner does not negligently operate an automo-

bile, but causes injury to his guest either by a defective car,
or because of an error in judgment due to inexperience, he
is not liable for the resulting injury. The host simply places
the automobile which he has to offer at the disposal and enjoyment of his guest upon equal terms of security with.himself. The guest is not on equal terms if he has no knowledge
of a serious defect, and the host has. The guest cannot
claim a right to greater security than the host. The guest
accepts the driver whom he knows is inexperienced, and unskilled and also accepts his host's dilaffidated car. So if the
guest as in Cleary v. Eckhart,8 is injured by an improper
application of brakes on a gravel road due not to negligence,
but to inexperience of which the host had prior knowledge;
or is injured by overturning due to a defective second-hand
spring while the automobile is carefully operated as in
O'Shea v. Lavoy,84 then the owner is not responsible. It must
be remembered, however, that though a guest accepts the
risk of a defect in the car of which he has knowledge, he
does not, therefore, accept negligent operation of the car
in reference to that defect. To state the same principle in
another way, the driver may be using due care to the guest
838191 Wis. 114, 210 N.IV. 267 (1926).
84 175 Wis. 456, 185 N. W. 525, 20 A.L.R. 1008 (1921).
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when operating a safe car in a certain way, but negligent to
the guest if operating a defective car-such as with poor
brakes-in the same manner.8 5
Where the guest is injured by a hidden trap of which he
has no knowledge, and the owner has, the owner must respond in damages. Thus in Hennig v. Booth,86 where the
accelerator was out of alignment and the owner was warned
by mechanics that it was dangerous, he was held liable to
his guests who were injured when the automobile collided
with another automobile due to the defect. One guest was
driving the defective car at the owner's request, with no
knowledge of the defect, and the other guest was riding in
the rear seat with the owner. Both guests recovered.
We can then readily see, following the analogy of vendors
of dangerous instruments, that the owner of an automobile,
even though not present, lends his motor vehicle to a guest,
and fails to disclose a defect, which he himself knows, renders himself subject to respond in damages not only to the
guest, but to any friends riding with the guest, if it is understood that the guest may so use the car.8 7 In such a situation, if the guest driver is not himself negligent, but the injury is caused by the defect, the guest driver is not responsible to his own friends, but the owner is. There are many
situations already mentioned where the driver, when differ-ent from the owner, is liable and the owner not. Here then is
a situation where the owner is responsible but the driver
not. This does not depend upon principles of agency. The
owner is liable even though the defective machine is in the
hands of an innocent bailee. Under the same principle, entrusting an automobile to a known inexperienced, incompetent driver may entail liability on the part of the owner
86
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to a guest injured by that driver, when the guest has no
knowledge of the driver's incompetency."8
It should be stated in conclusion that the guest is always
subject to the rules of contributory negligence and for that
reason may be barred from recovery where recovery would
otherwise be allowed on the foregoing principles. Even
though the law does not countenance back seat management
where "silence is generally golden" 89 there arises on many
occasions the duty to warn not only of external dangers
noticed by the passenger and not by the driver, but also to
remonstrate with the driver for his negligent conduct in
speeding or what not. It is unreasonable to expect the
passenger to keep the same lookout that the driver is under
obligation to do, yet he must in all cases use due care for
his own safety according to the exigencies of the case.9 0 That
exigency may in extreme cases call for an abandonment of
the car -and the driver by the guest."
Leo Orvine McCabe.
DePaul University, College of Law.
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